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12 February 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
12 February 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. USSR-Berlin: Moscow's announcements of air corridor restrictions may foreshadow new campaign of general harassments. (*Page i*)


25X1



3. The Congo situation. (*Page ii*)

4. France-Algeria: Officials of both sides expect early agreement. (*Page iii*)

25X1



6. USSR-Iran: Soviet draft of nonaggression agreement omits demand for ban on all foreign military bases but would ban foreign missile bases. (*Page v*)

25X1



25X1



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

12 February 1962

DAILY BRIEF

USSR-Berlin: The announcement of another restriction for the northern and central corridors for about two hours on 12 February suggests that the USSR may be prepared to embark on a new campaign of general harassments. Continuation of Soviet attempts to place unilateral restrictions on the use of the Berlin air corridors, despite the clear Western refusal to accept Soviet conditions, is strong evidence that Moscow hopes the creation of a potentially dangerous situation will bring about a change in the Western negotiating posture. The Soviets may calculate that this implied threat of further and more drastic steps, together with the deliberate stalling in the US-Soviet talks in Moscow, will induce the Western powers either to move directly into formal negotiations or to make concessions to the Soviet positions.

By resorting to unilateral moves in the sensitive area of Western access, the Soviets may be attempting to demonstrate that Khrushchev's withdrawal of a deadline for a separate treaty should not be interpreted as an indication that Moscow will be content with the status quo in Berlin. This attitude was emphasized in a long article in a special edition of Izvestia on 11 February which accused the West of avoiding solutions of major international issues and of playing for time, particularly on the Berlin question. At the same time, the Soviets apparently wish to provide some assurances, such as the timing of Powers' release and a 10 February central committee statement reaffirming the peaceful coexistence line, that they still prefer further negotiations to a unilateral solution of the Berlin problem by a separate peace treaty.

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25X1

Congo: U Thant, in conversation with a British UN delegate, indicated on 9 February that while he did not contemplate any military operation in Katanga which would lead to a resumption of hostilities, the UN was convinced of the necessity of stationing troops at Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Kipushi. Under Secretary General Bunche advised the US delegation on 10 February that any order for a troop movement outside Elisabethville would have to be cleared through UN headquarters in New York. The UN representative in Elisabethville, Jose Rolz-Bennet, advised the US Consulate on 10 February that the first joint UN-Katangan inspection teams--designed to search out mercenaries outside Elisabethville--left for Kipushi and Jadotville on 10 February.

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
25X1

12 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1



12 Feb 62

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Map Page

25X1 France-Algeria: The meeting of top level French and provisional Algerian government negotiators to try to reach final accord on Algeria appears likely to take place in a spirit of optimism and willingness to compromise. [REDACTED]

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The worsening split between left and right in France adds a new urgency to the negotiating situation. The French Socialist party, which did not officially join in last week's Communist-led demonstrations in Paris and which has regularly opposed cooperation with the Communists, has called for new demonstrations against the Secret Army Organization tonight. On 9 February Minister of the Interior Frey told Ambassador Gavin he was confident of police ability to handle the security situation, but joint action on the left makes more persuasive rightist arguments that moderates must join the right as the only bulwark against a popular front. The net effect may be to strengthen those forces already opposed to De Gaulle's Algerian policy. [REDACTED]

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25X1

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12 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200200001-0

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25X1

USSR-Iran: [The Soviet Union has substantially modified its maximum position in the current attempts to reach a bilateral nonaggression agreement with Iran. On 8 February, Soviet Ambassador Pegov, who had bypassed the Iranian Foreign Ministry and sought an audience with the Shah directly, presented a formal draft agreement which dropped the long-standing Soviet demand that Iran ban all foreign military bases as the price for improved relations and restricted the ban to "any kind" of foreign missile bases. The Soviet demarche came only five days after the Iranian foreign minister had read Pegov the text of a unilateral Iranian decision to ban foreign missile bases--a position which he characterized as the furthest Iran was willing to go. At that meeting, Pegov had indicated that the suggested note was insufficient, since it did not deal with nonaggression and was not bilateral.]

[The Shah has indicated that he will not agree to the Soviet draft, since it requires Iran to proclaim its "firm determination. . . not to permit Iranian territory to be used for aggression against the USSR." The Iranian foreign minister told Ambassador Holmes that he plans to call in Pegov "after a few days" and hand him the text of the Iranian unilateral declaration, not as a counterproposal but as an expression of Iran's position.]

25X1

25X1

12 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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